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Abstract 
Abstract of thesis entitled: 
The first chapter studies the dynamics between the labor markets of the public and 
private sectors. Empirical studies show that the wage structure of the public and 
private sectors alter workers' behavioral decision to allocate themselves between the 
sectors. For instance, the compression of the wage structure in the public sector in the 
United States affects the sorting of workers across the sectors (Borjas 2002). In the 
chapter, the model examines how the wage structure in the public and private sectors 
affect the labor composition, in terms of human capital, in the two sectors. It shows 
that high-skilled workers are more willing to work in the private sector if the wage 
distribution in public sector is less dispersed. The theoretical result supports the 
empirical study mentioned above. Moreover, we also examine other critical factors 
including i) technological improvement ii) household's risk attitude iii) risk in 
production and iv) wage in public sector. 
The second chapter discusses the evolution of the Chinese social security system, 
including pension, health insurance, as well as unemployment insurance. Currently, 
China has boldly adapted a social security system that includes the features of social 
pooling as well as funded system. The combination of the two systems of welfare 
provision is proved to be reasonably appropriate arrangement in the light of the 
current state of economic development in China. However, the financial arrangement 
of the transition from the old system to the new one arouses concerns from many 
Chinese officials and analysts, especially while the Chinese government is facing a 
ballooning budget deficit. In view of the social-economic development and 
demographic change in the coming century, it is also important to examine the 
sustainability of the current system in China. 
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Chapter 1 The Dynamics of the Labor Market across Public and Private 
Sectors in a Theoretical Model 
1.1 Introduction 
A vast empirical literature in labor economics investigates the differences in the 
wage structure of the public and private sectors in developed economies. Recently, 
there are more similar studies on some developing economies, such as Eastern 
Europe and Africa, in the literature. However, even in the same economy, the 
empirical studies still yield no unambiguous description about the wage structure of 
the public and private sectors. And, despite the very considerable attention lavished 
on the subject, there has been relatively less theoretical work on the relationship 
between the two different wage structures and the dynamics of the two labor markets. 
In the literature, some reasons are given to explain both higher and lower wages 
for public sector workers (Mueller 2000). To justify the wage premium in the 
public sector, it is argued that the sector is not subject to profit-maximization 
conditions. Second, the union participation rate is much higher in the public sector 
than in the private sector, as many empirical studies suggest that union members 
have higher wages than their non-union counterparts. Lastly, some studies argued 
that the labor demand of government service is inelastic because of the inelastic 
demand for those services. 
On the other hand, a number of factors is given to explain lower wages for 
public sector workers. First, the public sector service is subjected to consumer 
scrutiny, which could put a downward pressure on wages. Second, in some labor 
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markets, the public sector has monopsony power where wages may be lower. Third, 
in order to reduce turnover cost (Salop 1979) or discourage from shirking (Shapiro 
and Stiglitz 1984)，the private sector may set wages above market clearing levels. 
However, the public sector may not have such considerations. Last, non-pecuniary 
advantages, such as job security and generous benefits, in the public sector may 
compensate for lower base wages. This paper attempts to provide a model to 
capture the idea of the last explanation - j o b security. 
The objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical model to capture the 
dynamics of the labor markets in the public and private sectors. In the literature, 
Corneo and Rob (2000) develop a theoretical framework to incorporate "socializing" 
into a simple multitask model of work organization to comparing the style of work in 
public and private enterprises. Alternatively, the model provided in this paper 
incorporates risk aversion factor in the model. This paper argues that, in the 
decision of how workers allocate themselves between the two sectors, they will 
tradeoff between job security and wage level. The model agrees with the empirical 
studies (Bellante and Link 1981) suggesting that the more value the individual places 
on the job security associated with public sector employment, the greater his 
tendency to seek employment in the public sector. 
The prime assumption in this paper is that the job security in the public sector 
is higher than that in the private sector. The assumption is justified by empirical 
studies on different economies. In Britain, most public sector workers have more 
job security, measured by longer job tenures, than employees in the private sector 
(Disney and Gosling 1998). It is noted (Robinson 1997) that many civil service 
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employees enjoy higher degree of protection and privilege not found in the private 
sector. Empirical studies on Italian data (Cappellari 2002) indicate that public 
sector workers enjoy more stable earnings paths compared to their private sector 
counterparts. Moreover, a cross-sectional evidence (Rodrik 1997) supports the 
view that relatively safe government jobs represent a partial insurance against 
undiversifiable external risk faced by domestic economies. In those economies, 
governments can counteract the income and consumption risk faced by the 
households in the economy by providing a larger number of "secure" jobs in the 
public sector. 
While the model developed in this paper can be applied to the analysis of 
different labor market changes, it has with two specific applications. First, the 
paper suggests that the design of wage structure in the public sector will affect the 
labor allocation between the public and private sectors. The compressed wage 
structure will induce more people with higher human capital, such as educated or 
skilled workers, to leave the public sector and work in the private sector. The 
conclusion resonates with a recent empirical study in this regard (Borjas 2002). 
Second, the paper proposes that a government can affect the labor composition in the 
public and private sectors by adjusting the wage levels of different job levels in the 
public sector. Moreover, the government can affect the wage levels in the private 
sector by controlling the labor supply in the sector. Hence, the design of the wage 
structure in the public sector can be regarded as a policy instrument in the economy. 
The paper is organized into 6 sections. In Section 2, some empirical studies 
are documented. In Section 3, the model is specified. Section 4 characterizes the 
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agent's optimization problems，the market equilibrium and some comparative static 
results. Section 5 provides the extensions of the model. Some concluding remarks 
are offered in Section 6. 
1.2 Empirical Studies 
A number of empirical studies study the wage structure of the public and 
private sectors in the United States. Many studies agree that average pay is much 
higher in the public sector than in the private sector over time (Katz and Kruger 
1991). There is evidence that the wage advantage enjoyed by men employed in the 
public sector rose steadily over the past four decades (Borjas 2002). Moreover, by 
including the fringe benefits, Long (1982) provides further evidence that government 
workers receive economic rents in the form of higher wages or greater fringe benefits 
than in private jobs. 
To estimate the wage differential between the public and private sectors in 
detail, three methods are generally employed (Moore and Newman 1991). First, the 
wage levels of particular job classification or occupations in the public and private 
sectors are examined. By comparing the pay for similar jobs, many studies (Perloff 
1971, Fogel and Lewin 1974，Field and Keller 1976) suggest that federal and local 
government employees are overpaid in low skills, clerical, and craft occupations, but 
tend to underpay relative to private employees for jobs at the top end of the 
occupational scale. However, Smith (1976, 1977a, 1977b) suggests that male 
federal employees, even those in professional and managerial positions, are paid 
more than private-sector workers of comparable quality. 
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Second, the wage premium for those working in the public and private 
sectors, some believe, may be contributed to workers' different attributes, such as 
educational attainment, age, race, and region of residence, in the public and private 
sectors. By adjusting those attributes, the conclusions of those empirical studies on 
the pay gap between the public and private sectors are still also ambiguous. Katz 
and Kruger (1991) examine the college/ high school wage differential by sector. 
The public sector college wage premium remained fairly stable. Borjas (2002) 
shows that the typical public sector worker has not enjoyed a wage disadvantage over 
his statistically comparable counterpart in the private sector. 
Third, it is argued (Kruger 1974) that if public sector jobs have premium over 
private sector jobs, there will be a longer queue for them. With this hypothesis, 
some empirical studies (Long 1982, Kruger 1988a, 1988b) provide evidence that 
public sector workers enjoy a wage premium. 
Other than the study on the wage premium, the wage distribution in the 
sectors is also examined. Based on the March CPS Annual Demographic Files, 
Katz and Krueger (1991) suggest that, in the 1980s, there was a sharp increase in the 
wage differentials in the private sector, while the wage inequality barely increase in 
the federal government. Borjas (2002) suggests that the wage structure in the 
public sector is more compressed relative to the private sector. By comparing the 
standard deviation of log weekly income, he finds that there was a steep increase in 
wage dispersion for male workers employed in the private sector, while the public 
sector workers experienced a much slower rate of increase in wage dispersion. 
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For other developed economies, Mueller (2002) estimates the wage premium for 
public sector workers in Canada. Using the common decomposition methodology, 
the paper shows that public sector employees enjoy a wage premium compared with 
observable equivalent counterparts in the private sector. However, in order to 
consider some unobservable effects, fixed-effects estimation is also employed in the 
paper. The result is statistically insignificant for males. For females, it can still 
be concluded that there is a wage premium in the public sector. 
Recently, there are also some studies on the wage structure of the public and 
private sectors in some developing countries. Adamchik and Bedi (2000) use data 
from Poland to examine whether there are any wage differentials between workers in 
the public and private sectors. Different from the United States, after adjusting 
worker characteristics and sector selection effects, there is still a wage premium for 
those working in private sector in general. The wage premium is particularly 
pronounced for University-educated workers. 
In the Republic of Cyprus, there is a significant wage premium for those 
working in the public sector over its counterpart in the private sector (Christofides 
and Pashardes 2002). 30%-80% of the observed wage gap can be explained by 
differences in characteristics, depending on the decomposition approach adopted, but 
the most complex and complete model yields the highest estimate. In the study, the 
attributes affecting the choice of sector is also examined. The result suggests that 
highly educated and risk-averse individuals should have a preference for the public 
sector. 
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In short, empirical studies using different methods agree that the average pay 
in the public sector is higher than that in the private sector in the United States. 
However, after adjusting the workers' attributes in the two sectors, the existence of 
the wage premium is arguable. Some studies (Borjas 2002) suggest the wage 
premium is vanished, while the other (Perloff 1971，Forgel and Lewin 1974, Field 
and Keller 1976) argue that the wage premium still exist in some specific working 
levels, such as low skill clerical, and craft occupations. Meanwhile, some empirical 
studies (Krueger 1991, Borjas 2002) suggest that the wage structure is more 
compressed in the public sector than that of the private sector. 
1.3 The Model 
To have a better understanding on the nature of the labor markets of the 
public and private sectors, we set up a two-sector dynamic model. It is shown that 
some empirical results documented above are consistent with our theoretical model. 
1.3.1 Preferences of Working Agents 
The human capital of each worker, denoted as hi，is pre-determined and 
exogenous in the model. The index i e [0,1] represents the category of workers 
with same human capital. 
The objective of each worker is to maximize his utility. All type-I workes 
are sorted according to their risk preference and worker j in the set is identified by a 
risk-parameter, otij e [0,1] which follows a uniform distribution. The higher the ay, 
the higher the risk aversion of the worker is. Empirically, some studies 
(Christofides and Pashardes 2002) use life insurance expenditure as a proxy of 
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attitudes of risk. 
Let U denote the worker's utility. The utility function of a type-i worker j is: 
Uij(w)=E[U(w)]-aijC^ (J) 
where w is the wage and a^ is the variance of the utility. We assume that the function 
U is continuously differentiable with U(0) = 0 and U(w) > 0 for all non-zero w. 
Moreover, we assume that the individuals have identical preferences on expected 
wage, E[U(w)]. Here, we are considering a single-period model, all individuals 
consume all they receive in that period and there is no saving in the economy. 
Hence, each individual's utility is a function of his wage. Yet, we will explain in 
the following that the utility level is not monotonically increasing with wage when 
the risk factor is being considered. 
1.3.2 Production Technology 
For simplicity, we assume that the production in the private sector only 
requires the human capital input and labor effort. All firms in the private sector 
have identical production technology. The technology for producing goods of a 
representative firm in the private sector is characterized by the following constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. 
1 
Y =A f(5/ (hi hfdi i, 9e[0,1] (2) 
J 
Lo J 
where hj represents the human capital of type-i worker; Ij e [0,1] represents the 
proportion of type-i worker in the economy working in the private sector. The 
parameter 5i is the relative factor shares of type-i worker in the output. And the 
parameter 0 determines the value of the constant elasticity of substitution. A in the 
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production function reflects the production risk. For simplicity, we assume A takes 
two outcomes, 0 and A , with the probability \-p and p respectively. This is an 
extreme assumption, which simplifies the algebra. The assumption suggests that 
the public sector is the "safer" sector relative to the private sector. 
In modeling the problem, we ignore information asymmetric problem by 
assuming that the representative firm is able to identify each worker's human capital 
stock. Moreover, we assume that the labor markets of workers with different 
human levels of human capital are segmented. It suggests that workers cannot 
participate in other labor markets with other human capital levels for any reason. 
For the sake of simplicity, this paper assumes that the prime objective of the 
public sector is to maintain full employment of the economy. Hence, the public 
sector is setting up to absorb the residual supply in the market. As a result, the 
labor demand in the public sector is the residual supply of the aggregate labor 
market. In this model, there will be no queuing issue or recruiting problem in the 
public sector. This assumption is particularly useful to describe the public policy in 
transition economies. It is suggested that there is a desire for government to 
preserve jobs and minimize unemployment in order to lower social turbulence in 
many transition economies (Adamchik and Bedi 2000). Also, in transition 
economies, the standard presumption is that the prime objective of the public sector 
has been the welfare of its workforce. In attaining this objective, it is important to 
recognize that the public sector can separate output and employment decisions, and 
that the production is not necessarily a binding constraint (Jackman and Pauna 1997). 
Moreover, many African governments have frequently provided guaranteed 
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employment for school graduates. The governments have act as employers of last 
resort including those in Mauritius, Benin, the Central African Republic, Cote 
d'lvoire, Egypt, the Congo, Guinea, Mali, Rwanda, Somanlia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan 
(van Ginneken 1990, Gelb et. Al.，1991) 
Some studies (Jackman et al. 1992，Blanchard et al. 1994, Blanchard 1997， 
and Jackman and Pauna 1997) imply that the public sector in transition economies 
tradeoff employment against wage. However, in this paper, we assume that the 
public sector does not encounter any budget constraint. Hence, the wage in pubic 
sector is exogenous and not affected by the employment in the sector. In the 
Section 5，we will discuss how the wage in the public sector affects the labor 
markets. 
1.4 Optimization, Equilibrium and Some Comparative Static Results 
1.4.1 Optimization Problems 
Let us consider the representative firm in the private sector first. At the 
beginning, the representative firm chooses different labor inputs, Ij, for each i to 
solve the following optimization problem: 
I 
"1 -17 1 
max 71 = A Si (hi hfdi - w hdi (3) 
1, 
“ Lo J o 
where we assume the price of output is equal to one. 
1 0 
The first-order condition of the optimizing decision of the private firm is stated as 
follows: 
� - j i " ^ 
dnldU= ASh^ —— -Wi = 0 (4a) 
-也」 
w/= Adih 严—— (4b) 
L � d 
Noted that as reflected by (4b), individuals' wage in the representative firm 
will depend on the outcome of A. If A = A，then Wi= w . Otherwise, Wj = 0. 
This assumption suggests that, the representative firm will go to bankrupt when A =0. 
As a result, the individuals will receive nothing. The extreme assumption, which 
facilitates the algebra, may not match the real world perfectly. 
Hence, the expected profit of the representative firm is: 
_ � J / I 
E(k) = p ~ASh' ^ -p fw hdi (5) 
L � 0 
As we assume that the representative firm is risk-neutral, it will maximize its 
expected profit. The representative firm chooses different Ij to solve the 
optimization problem. 
r — -I \-0 - A — dE(7i) /di = pAdi - pwi = 0 (6a) [Yhi //J 
— — �Y—没 
w= ^ (6b) 
By re-arranging the above equation, 
I 3,hi A l i = Y ~ = ~ (6c) Wi 
1 1 
Labor demand decreases with the wage. 
1 
7i dih^ A ^ -
To maximize profit, wage will be equal to marginal product of labor. If the 
wage increases, the marginal product of labor should increase at the same time. As 
the marginal product of labor is a decreasing function of labor input, the labor input 
will also decrease. 
By the differentiation of (6c), we get the following comparative static results: 
” 7 • 傲 l ^ i h L A l V � n /7 > 
dh IdA = =—— > 0 (7a) \-0 wi 
The higher the A，the higher the marginal product of labor is. If the wage 
keeps constant, in order to maximize its profit, the representative firm will increase 
its labor input. 
I 
w / A 评「秘”；^‘严 � dli /chi= 二—— > 0 (7b) \-9 Wi 
The higher the level of human capital, hj, the higher the marginal product of 
labor is. For any given wage, the representative firm will hire more workers with 
higher human capital than those have less. 
To model the allocation problem, I begin by assuming the wage in the public 
sector to be a constant, Ws. Hence, the utility function of a type-i worker in the 
public sector is simply U(ws), which is strictly increasing. 
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For those workers in the private sector, their wages will be affected by the 
uncertainty in the production. Hence, we can define the workers' utility in the 
private sector as follows: 
Uij (wi)=pU (m) - aijp(J-p) U(wO ‘ (8) 
where E[Uij (wj)] = p U (Wi), and a ? = p(l-p) U( Wi) ^ 
The first part of (8) represents the expected utility and the second part 
represents the variance of the utility. 
Each worker has to decide to work in the public or private sectors by 
comparing the utility of working in the two sectors. The wage paid by the public 
sector is assumed to be lower than the expected private sector wage. For any given 
Wi，we can find a unique otj* by solving the following equation, which separates all 
type-i workers into two groups. 
= p ) - a* p(l-p) / (9a) 
For those who have otij greater than oti*, they will work in the public sector. 
Otherwise, they will work in the private sector. 
Rearrange the equation (9a), 
o c i �二 (9b) 
p(\-p)U(wi) 
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By differentiation of the first order condition, (9b), we get the following 
comparative static properties: 
dai* _ (1 -p)U(ws) + ppU(wi)-U(ws) 
： ‘：；~  >u (10) 
op p^(\-p/U(wi) 
where pU(wi) - U(ws) > 0. 
The increase in the probability of achieving the high output, p, will induce 
more workers joining the labor force in the private sector. 
a a * 1 �2f/’(S)"(w、’） 1 A / " � = = _ \ — _ 12 <or> 0 (11) 5 w O ) ( l - p ) L p\lJ{wi)\ _ 
⑴ （+) (-) 
An increase in wage will generate two offsetting effects on the labor supply in 
the private sector. The first is an increase in the expected utility, i.e. p u( Wi), thus 
induces more workers to work in the private sector. The second one is an increase 
in risk, i.e. otij p(l-p) U(wi) , faced by the workers, which will lower the labor 
supply in the private sector. Hence, the overall effect on the labor supply in the 
private sector is ambiguous. In spite of the ambiguity, from (11), we can conclude 
that, given the initial wage is low, the increase in wage will induce the increase in 
labor supply to the private sector. Workers will prefer to receive a higher wage 
although the risk increases at the same time. As the wage level in the private sector 
above a certain level, i.e. 2" _ 丄 ，in order to reduce risk involved, 
p u{wi) u{wi)‘ 
workers will be in favor of lower wages in the private sector. 
= < 0 (12) 
5"(w‘、,） p{\-p)[u{wi)\ 
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If u(ws) increases, more people will prefer to work in public sector, i.e. cc: is 
lower. 
By solving the representative firm's optimization problem and the workers' 
utility maximization problem, we can yield the solution for the market clearing wage 
and labor allocation. 
1.4.2 Market Equilibrium 
In a competitive equilibrium, the demand and supply of type-i labor should 
always be equal. In equilibrium, the marker clearing condition for the labor market 
will read 
1 
y = pu(Wi)-u(Ws) ( � 
[ � - pjuf 一2 
It is noted that the parameters in (13) is required to be within a certain range. 
Otherwise, corner solution will be yielded. The corner solution will be discussed in 
section 5 in detail. The left-hand side of the above equation represents the total 
demand for type-i workers while the right-hand side gives the total supply from all 
type-i labors. 





Two equilibria exist in the labor market (denoted as H and L) of the private 
sector. H represents a small private sector in the economy. There are little 
households working in the private sector but their wages are high. L represents a 
large private sector in the economy. There are many households working in the 
private sector but their wages are low. 
In determining the stability of the equilibria, we should study how the market 
price, i.e. wage, respond to the non-zero excess in demand. Assuming there are 
some factors shifting the labor demand to the right and/ or labor supply to the left, 
there is an excess demand. Through the tatonnement process (TP), in response to 
the excess demand, the private firm will increase the wage. However, the increase 
in wage will further increase the excess demand with initial equilibrium H. Hence, 
the TP leads away from new equilibrium. As a result, the equilibrium H is unstable. 
For the equilibrium L, as the excess demand is positive (negative) whenever wage is 
less (above) than its equilibrium value, the equilibrium L is a stable equilibrium. 
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1.4.3 Comparative Static Results 
To gain some intuitions about how the model works, some comparative static 
experiments will be undertaken. 
The Labor Demand Side Change 
First, consider an increase in A or h„ the Ls will shift to the right. Labor 
input, //, will increase. The effects on Wi will depend on the initial equilibrium (H 
or L). If the initial equilibrium is at L (H), Wi will increase (decrease). To 
consider the stability issue, there will be an excess demand initially. Hence, w 
should increase. For the initial equilibrium H, the increase in wi increases leads 
away from new equilibrium. As a result, the equilibrium H is unstable. 
Wi Labor Market 
A increase/ h, increase 
li 
Fig. 2 
From the Fig. 2, we can derive the relationship between labor input, and 






From the above graph, we can derive the graph below to indicate the 




At the initial equilibrium H, the household falls in the region I will work in 
the private sector. Otherwise, they will work in the public sector. At the initial 
equilibrium L, the household fall in I and II will work in private sector. Otherwise, 
they will work in the public sector. 
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In the following, we will discuss how the wage will change in response to the 
demand side change. At the initial equilibrium H, the wage will be lower to 
increase the labor supply, as workers are prefer to receive a lower wage to reduce the 
risk involved. At the initial equilibrium L，the wage will be higher to increase the 
labor supply, as workers prefer to a higher wage to increase their expected utility. 
w, 
I � 
A/h Fig. 5 
For the stable equilibrium L, workers with higher human capital will enjoy 
higher wage in the private sector than those having lower human capital. Hence, 
their risk, i.e. ay p(l-p) U( Wi) 2，is also higher than others. As a result, they should 
enjoy a higher wage premium for working in the private sector to compensate for the 
higher risk. The result is consistent with some empirical studies (Perloff 1971, 
Fogel and Lewin 1974，Field and Keller 1976) suggesting that federal and local 
government employees tend to underpay relative to private employers for jobs at the 
top end of the occupational scale, but are overpaid in low skills, clerical, and craft 
occupations. In other words, working in public sector is less attractive to workers 
with higher human capital level, which will be discussed in details in next section. 
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The Labor Supply Side Change 
A decrease in p will shift the Ld to the left. The effects on both w and li, 
will depend on the initial equilibrium. At the initial equilibrium L (H), w will 
increase (decrease)and I； will decrease (increase). For the stability issue, initially, 
there will be an excess demand. Hence, wi should increase. For the initial 
equilibrium H, the increase in Wi increases leads away from new equilibrium. As 
a result, the equilibrium H is unstable. 
Labor Market 
N, p decrease 丨繁 
Ii Fig. 6 
From the Fig. 6，we can derive the relationship between labor input and p to obtain 




In the following, we will discuss how the wage should change in case. At 
the initial equilibrium H, the market-clearing wage is decreased to increase the labor 
demand. At the initial equilibrium L, the market-clearing wage will be increased to 





1.5.1 Wage Structure in Public Sector and its Effect 
In this section, we will study how the wage structure in the public sector 
affects the dynamics of the labor market. In the literature, many studies attempted 
to explain the voluntary job changes in the economy. Mitchell (1982) examines the 
effect of fringe benefits on job changes by workers. The study indicates an 
important inverse relationship between fringe benefits and mobility, particularly with 
respect to the pension promise. Here, we suggest the wage structure will affect the 
labor allocation between the public and private sectors. In this section, we assume 
that the public sector adopts a linear wage policy, (Ws ； p), meaning the wage it pays 
its workers consists of a base salary, Ws, and a human capital-related premiums, (3 
hi.: 
Ws = Ws + p hi 
where (3 captures the characteristics of the wage structure in public sector. Higher 
the p, less compressed the wage structure in the sector is. Restricting the attention 
to linear scheme may be justified on administrative or practical grounds, as discussed 
in detail by Chamley et al. (1989). 
Let us use H(hi, 1丨）and R{U(phi, 1丨)} to denote the wage function in labor 
demand side and labor supply side respectively. In equilibrium, 
H(hi, li) = R{U(fih li)} (14) 
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Take total differentiation of (14), 
Hhdhi + Hidh = j3Rudhi + R,dli (15a) 
where Hh = 6w/5h > 0, Hi =5w/51 <0, Ru=5w/5u>0, Ri=5w/51>0 
Rearranging the equation, 
！ = 丄 丄 岡 
dh Ri-Hi Ri-Hi 
(+) (-) 
As mentioned before, p captures the degree of compression of the wage 
structure in the public sector, where (3 is negatively correlated to the degree of 
compression. From (15b), first, it is noted that, for (3 = 0, ~ - i s undoubtedly dhi 
greater than zero. The explanation is similar to the case of an increase in hj, which 
we discussed in the previous section. Second, we can conclude that if the wage 
structure is more compressed (i.e. the decrease in (3), people with higher level of 
human capital (i.e. the increase in hj) will tend to leave the public sector and join the 
private sector, and vice versa. The theoretical result is consistent with the following 
empirical studies. 
Katz and Krueger (1991) empirically examine how increase in wage 
compression in the public sector relative to the private sector in the 1980s affected 
public sector personnel outcome. The paper documents that there was a sharp 
increase in wage differentials in the private sector, but barely increased in the public 
sector. In the period, job queues have indeed expanded for blue-collar jobs and 
contracted for white-collar jobs in the federal government. Furthermore, the federal 
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government also seems to be having difficulty in retaining college graduates whose 
skills are valued highly in the private sector. 
Moreover, Borjas (2002) uses a regression model to examine the sorting of 
workers between the public and private sectors. In his model, there are two distinct 
groups of "marginal" workers. The first group is composed of workers who are 
initially employed in the private sector, and who over some time period enter the 
public sector. The second are workers who are about to leave the public sector and 
enter the private sector. The comparison of the skills of these two groups of 
marginal workers should indicate how the differential changes in the two structures 
affect the sorting of workers across sectors. It suggests that entrants will tend to be 
high-skill workers, and low skill workers will want to enter the public sector in 
1980s. 
The result shed lights on the public sector reform. It is suggested that the 
government should pay more attention to the design of the wage structure. In order 
to maintain a efficient public sector, a more flexible wage system should be 
established. The compressed wage structure in the public sector will make it 
difficult to attract and retained skill employees (Adamchik and Bedi 2000). 
1.5.2 How the Wage Levels in the Public Sector Affect the Private Labor 
Market 
In this section, we will examine how the change in wage levels in the public 
sector affect the private labor market. In the following, we will focus on the 
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relationship between the wage levels in the public sector and labor composition in 
the private sector. In the literature, it is argued that private sector employers may 
set wages above market clearing levels in order to reduce turnover costs and, thus, to 
increase the efficiency of the firm (Salop 1979) or may be paying higher wages to 
discourage workers from shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). However, there is a 
lack of models to consider how the wage levels in the pubic sector affecting the 
wage-setting decision in the private sector. Here, we will argue that the wage level 
of the public sector, through the change in labor supply, will affect the wage-setting 
behavior in the private sector. 
For simplification, we assume that there are only two kinds of working agents 
in the economy, who have high human capital (hi) and low human capital (h�） 
respectively. Hence, the production function of the private sector is: 
r = A[Sj(h,ljf+S2(h2l2) (16) 
The representative firm chooses Ij (i =1 or 2) to solve the optimization problem. 
max TV = A[di(h,l,f^52(h2l2) Y � w山 - W 2 I 2 li 
The first-order conditions of the optimizing decision of the private firm are as follow: 
r n \—0 
dn/dh= ASihi^ — -Wi = 0 (17a) !_•� 
厂 "1 
W] = ASxhx' — (17b) _ d / i � 
厂 "I丨一 0 





J ^ ^ Y ^ puM-u(^) fori二 lor 2 (18) 
where Wsi is the wage of working agent with human capital i in the public sector. 
It can be shown that the government can affect the wage levels in the private 
sector through adjusting its wage levels. If the government increases the wage in 
public sector, the Ls will shift to the left. The effects on w, and /, will depend on the 
initial equilibrium (H or L). If the initial equilibrium is in H, w, will decrease and 
/, will increase. Otherwise, w will increase and /, will decrease. For the 
equilibrium H, there will be an excess demand initially. Through the tatonnement 
process (TP), in response to the excess demand, the private firm will decrease the 
wage. The increase in the wage will further increase the excess demand. Hence, 
the TP leads away from new equilibrium. As a result, the equilibrium H is unstable. 




At the initial equilibrium H, the market-clearing wage is decreased to attract 
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more workers choosing the private sector. It is because workers will prefer to 
receive a lower wage in order to reduce the risk involved. At the initial equilibrium 
L, the market-clearing wage will be increased to induce more labor input. The 
higher wage will increase workers' expected utility. 
w, :> 
Fig. 10 
Moreover, by dividing equation (17b) and (17c), we have the following equation: 
WI MPLx , 1 � � 
——= = (18) 
W2 MPLi Sihih'-' 
The wage policy of the public sector can affect the composition of labor input 
in the private sector. If the government wants to improve the average quality (i.e. in 
terms of higher human capital) of working agents in the private sector, it can either 
decrease Wsi or increase Ws2, or both. As a result, the ratio of higher human capital 
labor to lower human capital labor {U/h) increased. Although unemployment is not 
considered in the model, it is not difficult to predict that the government can also 
reduce the unemployment rate in specific sector by altering its wage policy in the 
public sector. The tradeoff between the impacts on different labor markets is 
especially important if the government is facing a tight budget constraint. 
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In the above, we consider the case that we can achieve market equilibrium in 
all labor markets with different human capital. However, for some situations, the 
labor supply side may never meet the labor demand side. For instance, the Ws is too 





In case, the private sector cannot employ as much as worker they want to. 
Hence, we will obtain a corner solution in the optimization problem. To illustrate 
this situation, we assume that the labor market of working agents with higher human 
capital is excess in demand. Hence, the labor input of the private sector will be as 
follows: 
= pu(w\)-u(wsO (叫 
p(\-p)u(w\) 
We can find out the labor allocation and the wages for different capital by 
solving the following equations: 
Y = A[Sj(hjljf+S2MT' (16) 
厂 
m = — (17b) _ d / i � 
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厂 "|1一^^  
m = ASihi^ — (17c) - � 2 � 
1 
fori=lor2 (18) 
_ � p(q-y9>(^>V2� 
As Wsi and Ws2 are assumed to be given, there are still five unknowns to be solved {Y, 
Wsi, Ws2, I], I2)' By the five equations above, we can obtain the unique solution for 
the labor market. 
1.6 Conclusion 
There has been a great deal of empirical studies on the wage structure of the 
pubic and private sectors in different economies. Relatively, there has been less 
theoretical work on the issue. The wide variety of empirical studies provides a 
solid base for this paper to develop a theoretical model to describe the dynamics of 
labor market of the public and the private sectors. 
In this paper, we want to highlight the importance of uncertainty in the 
private sector, which echoing Rodrik's paper(1997) suggesting that the public sector 
in some developing economies providing a more secured job. Facing the 
uncertainty, working agents should tradeoff the risk and the expected wage in 
choosing between the public and private sectors. Hence, risk aversion is one of the 
most important attributes of the working agents to explain their allocation between 
the two sectors. 
Using the model developed in this paper, we argue that if the wage structure in 
the public sector is more compressed, workers with higher human capital will be 
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more willing to work in the private sector. On the other hand, by adjusting the 
wage levels in the public sector, the government can alternate the wage levels and 
labor participation in the private sector. 
There are many directions for future work. In this paper, we do not have 
much emphasis on the role of government in the economy. First, in this paper, we 
assume that the government does not face any budget constraint. By relaxing this 
assumption, we can achieve a general equilibrium, which is important for further 
explaining empirical studies. To modify the model, the government should impose 
tax on working agents to pay its wage bill in the public sector. 
Second, we do not clearly define the role of the government in the economy. 
In the literature, the objective of government is arguable. In classical economic 
theory, the government is going to maximize the social benefit or the social output. 
With this objective, in our model, the government can adjust its wage structure to 
change the composition of labor in the pubic and private sectors to achieve an 
efficient allocation. For political considerations, the government aims at wining the 
election. It should balance the different political forces in the economy. Hence, 
the government can also re-distribute the social resources among different groups of 
people (i.e. with different human capitals in our model). 
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Chapter 2 Pillars for the Growing Dragon: Social Security in China 
2.1 Introduction 
Amid its World Trade Organization entry, China becomes one of the most 
important players in the global economy. The sustainability of its rapid economic 
growth arouses much concern over the world. To materialize a sustained and 
healthy development of its economy, it is important for China to develop a 
well-established social security system. More than that, the establishment of social 
security system is also vital to its social and political stability. 
In the literature, there exist a number of studies on the China's pension 
system. Hussain (1994), Selden and You (1997)，Song and Chu (1997) examine the 
obsolete China pension system originated in the 1950s and call for a necessary 
reform. World Bank (1997) proposes a three-pillar pension system for China. 
Feldstein (1998) analyses the economics of pay-as-you-go option and 
investment-based defined contribution in the Chinese context. Li (2000), and 
Zhao and Xu (2002) evaluate the new established pension system in the 1990s and 
point out some underlying problems of it. 
Although there are few papers (World Bank 1997 and Li 2000) concerned 
about China's medical insurance system reform, the literature of China's social 
security reform highly focused on its pension system. Moreover, in the process of 
deepening its state-owned enterprise reform and the China's World Trade 
Organization accession, the unemployment rate in China is expected to increase, and 
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the establishment of a comprehensive unemployment insurance system becomes 
unavoidable. However, the discussion about the issue is also rare in the literature. 
In this paper, we discuss about the evolution of the social security system, 
including pension, health insurance, as well as unemployment insurance. It is 
suggested that the social security reform in China is largely motivated by the 
state-owned enterprises reform (Zhao and Xu 2002). However, in a boarder sense, 
the economic reform in different phases in China shapes the evolution of the whole 
system. In some cases, the social security reform facilitates the economic reform. 
However, in deepening the economic reform, new distortions are also created 
(Young 2000). The new distortions also hinder the further development of its social 
security system. 
Currently, China has boldly adapted a social security system that includes the 
features of social pooling as well as individualized pension system. The 
combination of the two systems of welfare provision is proved to be reasonably 
appropriate arrangement in the light of the current state of economic development in 
China. The financial arrangement of the transition from the old system to the new 
one arouses concerns from many Chinese officials and policy researchers, especially 
while the Chinese government is facing a ballooning budget deficit. In view of the 
social-economic development and demographic change in this century, it is also 
important for us to examine the sustainability of the current system in China. 
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. In Section II，we will 
consider the history and the evolution of social security system in China. Section 
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Ill examines the existing social security system. Section IV assesses the 
sustainability of the social security system in China, focusing on socio-economic 
development, demographic changes, and fiscal strength of the Chinese Government. 
Section V concludes. 
2.2 The Evolution of the Chinese Social Security 
2.2.1 The Establishment of the Social Security System since 1949 
After experiencing a long period of war efforts from 1937 to 1945 against 
Japan and subsequently a three-year period of civil war within China, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CPC) took power and established the People Republic of China in 
1949. The country was left in a poor condition. The total value of industrial and 
agricultural output in per capita terms was about RMB 66.1 in 1949, out of which 
agricultural product accounted up to 70 percents (Lin et al 1996). The important 
task for the newly established government was to restore the normal economic life of 
the nation and create a stable social and political environment. 
To the end of pursuing social and political stability, the Chinese government 
faced the task of setting up a comprehensive social security system. The 
legislation of labor insurance was first announced in 1950, and was enacted on 
February 26, 1951 for all China (Kraus 1982). The system was put into practice in 
state, joint state-private, private and cooperative enterprises if they employed more 
than one hundred workers. The social insurance fund was managed through The 
All China Federation of Trade Union under the highest supervision of the Ministry of 
Labor. The insurance fund was made up 3 percent of the total wage contributed by 
3 3 
the enterprises, deposited in the People's Bank. Of which 30 percent was used as a 
general insurance fund and the rest was used for the payment of pension and others. 
When the labor insurance regulation was first enacted, retirement age was set at 60 
for male and 55 for female with a total of 25 years of work required for male and 20 
for female. The payment of pension accounted up to 50% to 70% of workers' 
original wages. The number of persons covered by social insurance continued to 
increase in the plan period from 21 percents in 1952 to 47 percents in 1957. 
The evolution of the terms in the social security system in China was also 
seemingly related to the changes in the socio-economic environment and political 
considerations in China. For example, there were changes in the entitlement for 
retirement benefit due to changing economic environment for the period in 1951 to 
1958 during the First Five Years Plan. In 1958, while the total number of wage 
earners reached 25 million, the number of unemployed surged due to "blind 
movement of peasants to the towns" and the rapid expansion of population size. 
Hughes and Luard (1961) cited the People Daily in November 1957 that only a part 
of the available Chinese manpower can be absorbed in the industry in spite of it rapid 
expansion. Creating jobs was then on the top of the agenda of the Chinese 
government. Hence, new regulations on retirement were enacted that lowered the 
years of work required for retirement benefit from 25 to 20 for male and 20 to 15 for 
female. 
The dark age of the development of social security occurred during the period 
of Cultural Revolution in which the system was essentially seriously hampered. 
Cheng (2001) described the stage of the development of social insurance during 1966 
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to 1976 as a period of serious setbacks, destruction and damaged as well as 
regression. During the period, The All China Federation of Trade Union, the major 
administrative body of the social security system, was rendered inactive. It was not 
re-established until January 1, 1973, announced in the People Daily. In the spring 
of 1974，it was officially announced that all workers would be covered under state 
insurance. For this purpose, the state expended the annual aggregate wage up to 20 
percent. Workers were not allowed to contribute, however. Retirement age for 
women began at 55, for men at 60. Old age pensions ranged from 60 to 100 
percents of the last wage, depending on one's length of employment at a factory and 
one's contribution to production (Kraus 1982). However, a major change in the 
characteristic of the social security system occurred when the "Proposals for Reforms 
of Several Financial Rules in States Owned Enterprises (SOE) (Draft)" promulgated 
by the Ministry of Finance prescribed that all SOE should stop withdrawal of fund 
from the labor insurance fund. All labor benefits, including retirement and labor 
protection, should be paid outside the business account (Cheng 2001). This policy 
move put the end to the social pooling mechanism and shifted the burden of social 
insurance to the enterprises. The era of enterprise insurance began. Such 
arrangement created a heavy drawback of the development of states owned 
enterprises in China. 
2.2.2 The Reform in 1980s 
After the Cultural Revolution, the economic reform in China beginning in 
1978 was followed by the establishment of contemporary social security reform. The 
Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978 marked 
a beginning of the socialist modernization in China. It was a period of 
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experimentation of independent management autonomy, privatization of 
commodities and economic restructuring on price systems in the communist world 
(Chang 1998). Reform on enterprises began in Szechwan in 1978 for the 
experimentation of the "four modernization." Owning to the successful Szechwan 
reform, the subsequent number of enterprises undergone reform increased from 2600 
in 1979 to 6600 in 1980 (Kraus 1982). New style private and foreign invested 
enterprises and small co-operative and household units flourished as a result of the 
economic reform. 
Confronting the serious urban unemployment due to the return to the cities of 
approximately 10 million of the 17 million urban youth who had been sent to the 
countryside to work in the years after 1964. Again, the change of labor insurance of 
the SOEs was driven by the political considerations. The Chinese government 
promoted retirement by relaxing eligibility and generous benefits (Selden and You 
1997). The required number of working years to be eligible for pension was 
lowered to 10 years from 20 for male and 15 for female. Pension benefit now ranged 
from 60-90 percent of the last wage depending on the duration of services (Song and 
Chu 1997). However, the end result of this move was a rapid increase in the 
number of pensioners and a sharp decline in the worker-to-pensioner ratio (West 
1999). Old SOEs recorded heavy losses due to the expanding burden of pension 
insurance and were difficult to compete with other ownerships enterprises that had 
no responsibility to provide comprehensive benefits packages. 
Meanwhile, the coverage of the social security was also questionable. Due 
to the rapid economic reform in China, the number of non-states enterprises 
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employee increased dramatically in the early 1980’s. By mid-decade, the 
non-public sectors of the economy in China grew rapidly, it was estimated that the 
non-states units produced about 66 percent of the gross output value, increasing from 
22.4 percent in 1978. The state share of urban employment dropped from 78 
percent to 70 percent over the period from 1978 to 1985 and the proportion remained 
steady for the rest of the decade. About 70 percent of the urban population was 
excluded from the unit-based security without alterative forms of social security. 
These developments created the real momentum of social security reform in 1985. 
In 1985, the CPC approved the "the Suggestions about the "Seventh 
Five-Year Plan for National Economics and Social Development", which called for 
establishing a new labor insurance system which covering employees in government 
institutions, state-owned and collectively-owned enterprises as well as those in 
Sino-foreign joint venture and foreign-invested enterprises. The sources of funding 
for social security should be come from the state, enterprises and individuals jointly, 
not the state as the sole party being responsible for it in the previous. More than the 
labor insurance system, a more comprehensive social security system should be 
established. Multi-level governments should coordinate the development of 
different welfare provisions, especially for children, the elderly and the disabled. It 
also suggested the establishment of a "social relief fund" to protect the basic 
livelihood of the low-income group in urban and rural areas. 
In this regard, the National People's Congress approved "the 7th Five Year Plan 
for National Economic and Social Development" included the following on social 
security reform: 
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During the period of the Seventh Five Year Plan, we shall progressively to 
establish the socialist social security system with Chinese characteristics. We 
shall establish a comprehensive social security system to promote social welfare 
and improve the work on relief and assistance. Social security funds shall be 
raised through difference channels (Chapter 51) 
Hence, the government selected some provinces, including Shanghai, 
Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Sichuan, to undergo experiments in 
pension system reform. In the provinces, enterprises were required to contribute a 
certain percentage of their payrolls as pension funds. The pension payments of 
retired workers would depend on the contribution of their employers. This was the 
first attempt for China to change its pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system to a funded 
system. The systems have already included the enterprises as a source of pension 
fund, but still not the employees (Chow 2000). 
In the same year, the World Bank (1985) published a report, "China: 
Long-term Development Issues and Options". In view of the aging population, the 
report suggested to adopt a fully funded pension scheme which was solely funded by 
the enterprises. The employees were not recommended to contribute to the pension 
fund because of their low wages. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued 
articles in the mid-80s having similar suggestions. 
Other than the heavy burden of welfare responsibilities, the huge number of 
redundant workers was the major barrier of the SOE reform in this phase, which 
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targeting to increase its efficiency. In 1986, the State Council promulgated three 
provisional regulations (State Council 1986) regarding the labor system reform of the 
enterprises. Under the provisional regulations, new recruits of state-owned 
enterprises should be employed under "contract worker system", enterprises were 
able to discontinue the employment after the contract terminated. Moreover, the 
enterprises were empowered to lay off undisciplined workers. At the same time, the 
"Bankruptcy Law (Trial) of the People's Republic of China" was passed. To 
support the labor system reform, the State Council promulgated the "Provisional 
Regulations on Awaiting Employment Insurance for Workers in State Enterprises". 
The Regulations are applicable to workers who work in bankrupt enterprises and in 
enterprises undergoing reorganization, contract workers whose contracts have 
expired or been terminated by the enterprise, and workers who have been dismissed 
by the enterprise. The enterprises were required to contribute to the awaiting 
employment fund in the amount of 1% of the standard wages of all workers 
employed. In the event that the fund is inadequate for necessary expenditures, local 
finance authorities shall make up the deficit Those eligible for the awaiting 
employment insurance could receive monthly payments, which amount according to 
their average standard wage during his last two years and their working age. 
2.3 The Existing Chinese Social Security System 
The drawbacks of the economic reform in the mid-80s gradually appeared in 
the early 90s, such as the increase in awaiting employment. In 1990，outlines for 
"The Year Plan and the Eighth Five-Year-Plan for the National Economy and Social 
Development of the People's Republic of China" passed. It contains promotion of 
the social security system that includes pension insurance, unemployment insurance, 
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and medical insurance reform. However, considering the social stability and 
ideology, the economic reform in urban areas, especially in state sector, was still 
controversial and the government's approach was cautious. Hence, the drawbacks 
were still at the manageable level. Because of lack of the urgency, the social 
security reform was still more in words than actions. 
Till 1992, Deng Xiaoping's "Nanxun" (Southern Inspection) demanded faster 
economic growth and more open reforms. The Chinese constitution scrapped the 
planned economy under public ownership in favor of "socialist planned economy 
with "Chinese characteristics" in the 14th National People's Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Three key changes in the economic reform should be mentioned. 
First, the management of SOEs gained more controls over the operation of their 
enterprises, but also were required to face harder budget constraints. Hence, the 
unbalanced enterprise-based social security system should be changed to provide a 
fair competitive environment for enterprises with different ownerships. Second, the 
preferential policies given to the coastal region enlarged the difference in economic 
developments among different regions. As a result, the regional variation was an 
important consideration in the social security reform in the phase. Third, during the 
economic reform in this period, new faces in the economy emerged, including the 
increase in the number of enterprises with different ownerships. 
In the 15th Congress of the CPC, further reform of the state-owned 
enterprises was stressed, which including "a clear definition of ownership, 
well-defined powers and responsibilities, separation of the political administration 
and the enterprises, and the employment of scientific management. Under such 
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circumstances, the state-owned enterprises are responsible for their own profit and 
loss. There is no doubt that there should be restructuring, merger and acquisition, 
and even bankruptcy during the reform undergone. The social security reform was 
inevitable amid the new economic development. In the National People's Congress 
in 1997, in order to alleviate the social impact, the reform of the social security 
system was named as one of the six major issues in the state-owned enterprises 
reform. During the Congress, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was 
established which is currently a vital part of the effort to create a comprehensive new 
social security system and facilitates welfare transfers through redistribution of 
resources. The new instituition co-ordinates six subsystems - social assistance, 
social insurance, social welfare, medical care, military personnel protection and 
supplementary protection programs. It also oversees programs such as old age 
insurance, worker disability insurance, unemployment insurance, medical insurance 
and maternity insurance. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and 
the Ministry of Finance has been working towards increasing the coverage of social 
security over state-owned, collective and private enterprises. 
Financing method that combines social collection and individual saving 
accounts is the new innovative feature in the Chinese social security system. 
Social insurance fund is made of premium contributions from the enterprises and 
workers. In 1999, the Interim Provision for Social Insurance Collection were 
issued, requiring businesses to pay 29 percent of the average wage for their 
employee's basic pensions insurance, basic medical insurance, unemployment 
insurance, and work injury insurance. Employees on the other hand pay 7 percent. 
About 40% of the total contribution goes to the personal saving account and the rest 
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contributes to the social insurance fund. Although the provision of social security 
benefit has been largely realized, it is at the cost of accumulation of subsidization of 
the central government budget. With the huge subsidy from the central 
government, the social security fund is running a surplus of RMB 1054 billion in 
2001 (Table 3). 
In 2002, a total of RMB86 billion for social security programs will be 
earmarked in the central budget. Facing increased expenditures for the basic 
pensions of retirees of SOEs and the number of laid-off workers in 2001, a total of 
RMB51.2 billion from the centra丨 budget will be allocated to subsidize pensions for 
retirees of state-owned enterprises and living allowances for their laid-off workers in 
2002. On the other hand, in order to solve the problem of basic living allowances 
for urban residents with low incomes, the State Council has decided to increase 
subsidies from the central budget to their subsistence allowances from 2.3 billion 
yuan in 2001 to 4.6 billion yuan in 2002 (Xiang 2002). 
2.3.1 Pension Reform 
In the late 80s, the decrease in competitiveness of SOEs in a competitive 
market environment and the increase in worker-to-pensioner ratio caused a gradual 
erosion of welfare benefit over the period in the unit-based pension system. In 
1991, in line with the "Eighth Five Year Plan", the ‘‘Decision of the State Council on 
the Reform of the Old Age Insurance System for Enterprise Workers" was 
promulgated. The coverage of the "Decision" was still only the employees in 
SOEs, and collective-owned enterprises and foreign investment enterprises could 
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comply with the "Decision" at their own discretion. In order to enhance the pooling 
effect, the "Decision" targeted to set up the old-age insurance funds at the provincial 
level. The "Decision" suggested the pension system should be the combination of 
the basic old-age insurance, the enterprise supplementary old-age insurance, as well 
as the workers' individual savings insurance. Three parties - the state, enterprises 
and also individual workers - are responsible for the funding of the pension system. 
For the basic old-age insurance level, the local government at different levels made 
their own decisions in determining the contribution rate of the enterprises and the 
employees, according to their affordability and the actual amount of current pension 
payments. A special account should be set up in designated banks by the social 
insurance agency for managing the fund. The individual saving account is set up as a 
financial arrangement that both the individual worker and the employer contribute a 
fraction of the worker's wage for the worker's retirement use. The individual 
account savings can only be used upon retirement and cannot be withdrawn before 
then. Therefore, China has combined social pooling and individual retirement 
account system that the latter arrangement is currently evocated in the US in her 
social security reform of privatization. 
After the "Decision" announced, provinces, and even cities within a province, 
established old-age insurance systems in different context due to their differences in 
economic development. To standardize and regulate different systems, the Third 
Plenary Session of the 14th Communist Party Central Committee in 1994 specified 
an overall framework for the establishment of the national social security system. It 
called for a multi-pillared system combining social basic pillar with supplemental 
enterprises-sponsored pensions and individual savings for old age. In 1995, the 
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State Council promulgated the "Circular on Deepening the Reform of the Old Age 
Insurance System for Enterprise Workers". In the "Circular", there were two 
options for local governments to implement according to their actual economic 
development. The "Circular" also regulated the management of the pension fund: 
the accumulated pension should, other than the amount keeping for the 2-month 
payment, be invested not less than 80% in designated national bonds. 
The "Circular" gave the local authority high flexibility to design their pension 
system themselves. Under such circumstances, there was still huge difference 
among different pension systems in different areas, which inhibited the labor 
mobility among provinces and cities. On the other hand, most basic old-age 
insurance systems were set up at the city- or county- level, instead of at 
province-level, which undermined the pooling effect of the systems. To further 
unify the systems, the State Council issued the "Decision on Constructing a Unified 
Old Age Insurance System for Enterprise Workers" in 1997. According to the 
"Decision", enterprise contribution should not exceed 20% of its total payroll, unless 
with the approval from the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Finance jointly. 
The individual labor contribution rate should not be less than 4% in 1997. After 
that, the rate should be increased by 1% annually, until reached 8%. The total 
contribution to the individual basic old-age account is 11% of the individual's salary, 
which includes all individual contribution and the enterprise contribution. The 
pension payment included the basic pension, in the amount of 20% of the local 
average salary, as well as the accumulated fund in individual accounts divided by 
120. 
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Currently, the total number of employed persons in China who participated 
the old age social security plan is around 106.8 million; whereas the number of 
retired is 34.01 million. Out of which, 91.75 million are employed in the private 
enterprises. At the end of March 2002, the total number of people who received old 
age social security benefit reached 32.03 million (Table 4). 
2.3.2 Unemployment Insurance Reform 
In line with the state-owned enterprise reform, the State Council issued the 
"Decree on Unemployment Insurance for State-owned Enterprise Workers" in 1993. 
The "Decree" covered awaiting employees in state-owned enterprises. The 
enterprise was required to contribute 0.6% of its total wage bill to the awaiting 
employment insurance, which rate could be increased or decreased subject to local 
governments decision, but should not be more than 1%. The awaiting employment 
insurance fund was administered at the city or county level, at which the provincial 
government could balance the funds within the province. 
Expenses of the funds included: awaiting employment assistantship, medical 
expenses and other assistance for their dependants, training and employment 
assistance expenses, expenses to assist workers to return to production, management 
fees for the unemployment insurance fund, and other expenses to relieve the hardship 
of awaiting workers. According to the "Decree", workers who have worked for 1 to 
5 years could receive the awaiting employment assistantship for 12 months; those 
who have worked for more than 5 years could receive that for 24 months. Different 
from the Provisional Regulations in 1986, the calculation of awaiting employment 
assistantship was linked to the level of local social relief, rather than the awaiting 
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employment worker's previous wage. The assistantship should be around 120 to 
150% of the level of social relief provided by the local Civil Affairs Bureau. 
After the "Decree" promulgated, different provinces and municipalities have 
tried to establish their own unemployment insurance systems based on the "Decree" 
and their own situations. In Liaoning Province, 10% of the collected fund will 
contribute to a provincial-level awaiting employment fund in order to achieve better 
pooling effects. In Beijing, the employers are required to make contribution in the 
amount of RMB2 per month. In the case of Guangzhou, the level of awaiting 
employment assistantship is based on the worker's working age and average salary 
(Chow 2000). 
In 1997, Jiang Zemin called for the establishment of the social security 
system that composed of social pooling and individual pension account system as 
well as an improvement of unemployment insurance in line with the SOE reform. 
The further perfection of the unemployment insurance system became unavoidable, 
in response to the decision of the First Session of the Ninth NPC in 1998 to 
deepening the reform of the state-owned enterprises. 
(State) Enterprises that have a market for their products but are suffering from 
an over-heavy burden and management difficulties should regroup their assets 
and readjust their structure, through mergers and coalitions, to regroup the idle 
assets. Bankruptcy and closing are the only options for enterprises that cannot 
find any market for their products, have a history of losses, are not expected to 
make up their losses 
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Over the course of development, unemployment and poverty remained to be an 
important issue in China. In 1999，Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the "three security 
line" 一 re-employment center, unemployment insurance and minimum living 
standard - at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth National People Congress that 
consisted of the security of the basic living for laid-off employees of SOEs, 
unemployment insurances and security for the poorest urban dwellers (Cheng 2001). 
On 28th December, 2000，People Daily reported that about 95 percent of the workers 
laid off from state-owned enterprises have received their basic living expenses and 
about 98 percent of retirees received their pension in time and in full amount. The 
first security line is required all state-owned enterprises to establish their own 
re-employment centers. The establishment of the centers is aimed at alleviating the 
burden of state-owned enterprises and securing laid-off workers' rights and 
encouraging their re-employments. Between 1998 and 2000, there were 21.37 
million laid-off workers. The laid-off workers mainly came from old industrial 
bases (25% came from the "Three Northeastern Provinces"); and from coal, textile 
and machinery industires. At the end of 2001, the number of laid-off workers 
entering re-employment centers was 4.64 million, which was 89.9% of the total 
laid-off workers. In 2001, the number of laid-workers in re-employment centers 
were re-employed was 2.27 million. The re-employment rate was 30.6% (Table 5). 
Two types of workers are eligible for entering the re-employment centers: 1. the 
employees who worked for state-owned enterprises before the implementation of 
labor contract system are laid off but the labor relationships have not discontinued; 2. 
the laid-off workers' contract agreements were not finished. The period of laid-off 
workers entering the re-employment centers in general should not exceed three years. 
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After the three years, the enterprises should terminate the labor relationships with the 
laid-off workers, who should be secured by the second and the third level of the 
system. 
Laid-off workers in the re-employment center should receive basic living fund, 
which should not be less than unemployment insurance payment. The centers are 
responsible for making contributions of pension fund, medical fund, and 
unemployment insurance for the laid-off workers. The base for calculating the 
contribution will be 60% of the local average salary. Also, the centers will organize 
training programs and provide career consulting services. The laid-off workers are 
also entitled to some policy incentives which encouraging them to leave the 
re-employment centers. For example, the laid-off workers who decided to carry out 
residential service can enjoy simplified business registration procedures, and 
exemption for operating tax, personal income tax and administrative fees in first free 
years. Some departments should waive some administrative fees for those who 
decided to carry out other commercial enterprises. Financial institutions are also 
required to offer financing to those enterprises in line with industry policy. The 
sources of funding will use so-called "Three-Three method": 1/3 from local 
government budget, 1/3 from enterprises and 1/3 from social pooling (partly from 
unemployment insurance fund). The Central government will give some supports 
to the mid-west region and old industrial bases. Local governments will subsidize 
some enterprises in deficit in this regard also. At the end of 2000, re-employment 
centers in all regions were running surplus with the support of government finance 
(Table 6). 
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In the same year, the State Council promulgated the "Regulations on 
Unemployment Insurance" in 1999. This is the first time the Chinese government 
formally used the term of "unemployment" instead of "awaiting employment", which 
admitting that unemployment would exist in "socialist" society. The great progress 
of the "Regulations" was to cover workers in all urban enterprises, including 
state-owned enterprises, as well as collective enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises 
and private enterprises. This measure broadens the source of contribution. The 
period for unemployed worker eligible for receiving unemployment insurance 
payment, ranging from 12 months to 24 months, depends on the worker's time span 
contributing to the fund. After that, unemployed workers can receive 80% of 
unemployment insurance payments if they are still not able to find a new job; if they 
reach their retirement age, they can then receive pension payments accordingly. 
The amount of unemployment insurance payment should be lower than local lowest 
salary level, but higher than local lowest urban living standard. The fund is 
managed by the social insurance authority and is used for providing social welfare 
services, such as unemployment insurance and assistant that guarantees the basic 
standard of living of the unemployment. Other than ensuring unemployed workers' 
livelihood, the unemployment insurance fund is also aimed at helping them to find a 
new job too. According to the "Regulations", the fund should be also used to 
support re-training program and to subsidize job-matching process. 
Contemporary major challenge faced by the modern social security system in 
China remains the provision of unemployment insurance to the urban unemployed 
due to the increase of unemployment in urban area and surplus rural labor. 
Re-employment training for the laid-off workers from the urban area is also a vital 
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part of labor policy in China. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security indicated 
that the number of jobless in the country continued to be a "vexing" problem. To 
develop a concrete picture about the labor market situation in China, let us consider 
some official statistics. In 2000, the registered urban employment was 5.95 million 
and the urban unemployment rate was 3.1% (Table 7). However, the figures did not 
include the laid-off workers from the SOE, which was 10.98 million in the same 
year. According to the official release of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
on April, 2002, the total number of unemployed from the SOEs is 4.9 million of 
which 4.3 million entered the re-employment services center and almost all of them 
received basic living expenses insurance and participated the re-employment plan. 
Under provision of the re-employment services center, participants received enough 
money for maintaining their basic living standard and meanwhile, the government 
will pay the social security contribution on the behalf of the unemployed. The 
unemployment insurance scheme covers 103 million employed persons in China and 
3.12 million are receiving unemployment insurance. The total expenditure out of the 
unemployment insurance is RMB 157 billion, of which 88 billion was spent on basic 
living expenses insurance and 45 billion on running the re-employment centers 
(Table 8). And yet, according to official statistical report released by the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security in China, the unemployment insurance fund is running a 
surplus of around 30 billion in 2001. 
2.3.1 Medical Insurance Reform 
Facing the rapid expansion in the medical expenditure in the 1980s, the 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance promulgated the "Measures 
Regarding the Administration of Medical Care Services for Enterprise Workers" in 
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1989. The "Measures" clarified which kind of medical expenses should be paid by 
public medical fund and individual respectively. Moreover, the "Measures" 
suggested that a comprehensive public health care network should be established, in 
which workers should receive their medical treatment in specific designated medical 
institutions. Meanwhile, four cities (Dandong, Siping, Huangshi and Zhuzhou) 
were chose to be the experiment cities to undergo medical health care system reform. 
In 1993，the CPC approved the "Decision on Problems Relating to Establish Chinese 
Socialist Market Economy System", which suggested that enterprises and workers 
should be responsible for the health care insurance fund. The system was a 
combination of social-pool account and individual account. 
The State Systems Reform Commission, together with the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Health, issued the "Views on an 
Experiment to Reform the Medical Care System for Urban Workers" in 1994. 
Enterprises should contribute to the medical insurance fund as a percentage of its 
total salary. The percentage was determined by the actual medical expense in last 
year. If the rate was lower than 10%, it could be approved by provincial 
governments. If higher than 10%, the provincial government should submit the 
proposal to the Ministry of Finance for approval. For workers contribution, the rate 
should start at 1%, and be gradually raised in line with economic development and 
the wage increase. The worker's contribution and the majority (larger than 50%) of 
enterprise's contribution should go into the individual account. The remaining of 
enterprise's contribution should be used to establish the social-pool medical 
insurance fund. The medical expense for individual worker should use the 
accumulated fund in his individual account first. After the individual account used 
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up, the worker was responsible for the remaining. If the exceed amount was more 
than 5% of the worker's wage, the social-poo丨 medical insurance fund and the 
worker would pay for it jointly. This measure aimed at reducing the abuse of 
medical services and alleviating the expansion of medical expense. Jiujiang in 
Jiangxi Province and Zhenjiang in Jiangsu Province were chose as the experiment 
cities of the reform. It was reported that, at the end of 1995, the participation rate in 
Zhenjiang was 95% and 93% of contributions had been collected. In Jiujiang, 90% 
of the government units and 88% of the enterprises had paid their contributions 
(World Bank, 1997). 
With the successful implementation in the two cities, in 1996，the State 
Council decided to expand the scope of the experiment. The number of experiment 
cities increased to more than 50. Moreover, private enterprises and foreign-invested 
enterprises in the selected cities were also required to participate in the reform. The 
establishments of the medical insurance system experiment in different experiment 
cities were roughly the same as mentioned in the "Views". The most different part 
among them is the responsibilities among social-pool fund, enterprise's contribution 
and worker's contribution. 
In December 1998，the State Council promulgated "Decisions on Establishing 
the Basic Medical Care System for Urban Workers" to broaden the reform to the 
nationwide. According to the "Decision", all enterprises, including state-owned 
enterprises, collective-owned enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises and private 
enterprises, are required to participate in the medical insurance system. The system 
is administered at the city-level. Enterprises should contribute about 6% of the 
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workers' wage, and the worker's contribution rate is set at 2%, both which subject to 
change in line with economic development. All workers' contribution should be 
accumulated in their individual accounts. About 30% of the enterprises' 
contribution would go into the individual accounts. The remaining is to establish 
the social-pool medical fund. The two kinds of accounts should be administered 
and utilized separately. The "Regulations" defined the start-up payment level 
(about 10% of local average wage) and maximum payment level (about 4 times of 
local average wage). Workers should pay for the medical expense below the 
start-up payment level by their individual accounts. The medical expense between 
the start-up level and maximum payment level would be largely paid by the 
social-pool medical fund, with a certain percentage paid by workers. Other 
methods, such as commercial insurance, are used to pay the medical expense above 
the maximum payment level. According to the statistics released by the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security, the medical insurance fund was running a surplus at the 
amount RMB10.98 billion (Table 9). 
2.4 Sustainabilitv Problem in the Chinese Social Security System 
In deepening the economic reform, especially the state-owned enterprise 
reform, the social security system in China is expected to play a central role in 
maintaining a stable social and political environment. As mentioned before, in the 
1990s, the modem Chinese social security system is basically established. 
However, there are still many rooms for improvement. Among them, its 
sustainability is the most key question aroused much concern from academics and 
Chinese policy makers. The sustainability of a social security system depends on 
whether it is able to make expected benefit payments in short run, as well as in long 
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run. In this section, we will examine the sustainability of the Chinese social 
security system. 
1. Transitional Problem 
As mentioned before, the initial setup of the Chinese social security system 
was a pay-as-you-go system. A pay-as-you-go social security system basically 
requires no accumulation of reserves. The financing of the social security payments 
comes from the existing working population. In view of aging problem, which we 
will mention later, the Chinese government decided to change its pay-as-you-go 
system into a partially funded system. In the process of the transition, the 
government should finance the existing committed payments of the old system either 
from existing working population or by other means. Based on the calculation in 
the World Bank Report (1996), the total transition payment could reach RMB1917.6 
billion if the reform had been taken place in 1995. 
In the mid-1990s, although the individual account for each worker is 
established, some local governments used the accumulated funds in the accounts to 
fulfill the commitment in old system. As a result, the practice was not materially 
different from the previous pay-as-you-go system. Under such circumstances, the 
central government strengthened the enforcement to ensure the accumulated fund in 
individual account is used properly. 
However, instead of the existing working population, the financial burden 
was shifted to the local governments and enterprises. The problem has not yet 
solved. It is reported that there is a number of protest, especially in some old 
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industrial provinces like Laoning, as the SOEs and the local government cannot 
fulfill its social security payment commitment. The central government 
unavoidably should step in and assist the local government to solve the problem. In 
the last few years, the central government issued national bond to finance the 
payments of the old system. Yet, the feasibility of continuing the financing is 
questionable amid the ballooning budget deficit of the central government, which 
will be discussed in the following section. On the other hand, the central 
government also attempted to meet the requirement through the sale of asset of SOEs 
in the stock market. However, the measure is ceased because of the fragile stock 
market. 
2. Fiscal Strength of the Chinese Government 
Before the reform, almost all individuals are working in the state-owned 
enterprises. At that time, the government, through the state-owned enterprises, was 
entirely responsible for the well-beings of its workers. Although collective 
enterprises and private enterprises are the major portion of the economy now, the 
central government is still a last resort in providing a safety net for its citizens. In 
2000, RMB5.4 billion interest tax of collection in the first half of the year was used 
to finance the expenditure on social security.! The expenditure on society security 
of the national government was increased by 423.8% from 1997 to 2001 (i.e. 
RMB 15.0 billion to RMB78.6billion). In addition, the government spent about 
RMB30 billion each year (from 1999 to 2001) to support the national social security 
fund, which will be mentioned in the following. (Table 10) 
‘ A s i a n i n f o Daily China News, August 14, 2000 
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Moreover, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) was established in 2001 
to serve as a reserve to support future national social expenditure. Initially, the 
NSSF was mainly contributed by selling a part of the state holdings in Chinese 
companies. According to the regulation, companies launching initial public 
offerings or additional share issuing should at the same time sell their state holdings 
equivalent to 10 per cent of the offering value to public. The money raised will be 
put into the NSSF.� However, the financing plan was abandoned in June 2002 to 
avoid putting too much strain on flagging equity markets.� Meanwhile, from 
2001, 80% of the commonwealth capital from newly issued lottery should be 
submitted to the NSSF.* By the end of 2001, the NSSF amounted to RMB80.51 
billion, in which RMB79.526 billion was from financial appropriations, including 
RMB12.178 billion from sell-down of state shares in listed companies, and RMB984 
million from operation yields in the last two years.^ 
The NSSF is allowed to invest in stock market, but not exceed 40 per cent of 
the total fund. The equity of the fund reached RMB124.19 billion in 2002, which 
mainly contributed by the government. The asset of the fund included national 
bond (22.06%), bank deposit (75.60%), stock (1.02%) and other bonds (0.48%). 
On the other hand, six fund companies were appointed to be managed the fund. At 
the same time, related departments are considering to list the NSSF.^ 
Although the central government attempts to step down from the pivotal 
position of the social security system recently, it still gives some sorts of financial 
2 China Daily, June 15’ 2001 
3 Far East Economic Review, July 4’ 2002 
4 Asianinfo Daily China N e w s , May 10, 2000 
5 Asianinfo Daily China N e w s , May 28, 2000 
6 SinoCast China Business Daily News , March 18，2003 
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support to the system directly or indirectly. First, as mentioned before, the central 
government issued national bonds to back up the payments of the old system. 
Second, under the new system, some backward provinces are still not able to finance 
their own social security system. Under such circumstances, the central 
government is required to support them in this regard. Finally, the active fiscal 
policy of the central government in recent years can also be regarded as some kind of 
indirect social security measures. In these years, in order to boast up the domestic 
demand, the huge infrastructure projects, such as "Go-West Campaign", are 
undergone. Although the projects, on one hand, are in favor of long-term 
development, on the other hand, they are also aimed at maintaining the 
unemployment rate at an acceptable level. The measure alleviates the pressure on 
the formal social security system. 
In 2002, the budget deficit of the central government increased to RMB309.8 
billion, amounting to 3% of the annual GDP. In line with the proactive fiscal 
policy, the issuance of national debt reached RMB660 billion and will be increased 
by RMB140 billion in 2003. The fiscal system of the central government even 
looks more fragile if we further consider the implicit national debt, such as bad debt 
in the banking system and the promised social security payments. As a result, on 
one hand, the continuity of the active fiscal policy is questionable, although the 
central government still pledged to pursue the policy in the NPC in 2003. On the 
other hand, the subsidy to the social security system of the backward provinces is a 
heavy burden to the central government, which may no longer be affordable in the 
future. More important, it is doubtful that whether the central government can still 
be the last resort in supporting the whole social security system. 
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3. Demographic Factor 
One of the major objectives of the social security reform in China is to 
transform the system from a sole pay-as-you-go system into a two-tier system. The 
first tier is still a pay-as-you-go system in order to maintain a basic living standard 
for beneficiaries. The second tier is a funded system to ensure individuals 
accumulating enough money for their future. While the second tier has not yet been 
established well, the system still largely depends on the first tier. As a result, it is 
important for us to further have a closer look on the most important factor, 
demographic structure, affecting the sustainability of the pay-as-you-go-system. 
In the late 1970s, China adopted the one-child policy in order to control the 
expansion of the population at that moment. However, the policy also had its own 
serious side effect. Now, many working couples will have to support four parents. 
On the other hand, the medical improvement also increases the life expectancy in 
China. It is expected that the burden of the working population in the future will be 
increased heavily due to the demographic change. According to the World Bank 
report (1994), by 2020, the elderly (age sixty and older) will make up about 16 
percent of the population. It also quoted that the Chinese government estimated the 
dependency rates would climb form 14.8 percent in 1990 to 47.3 percent in 2030. 
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4. Immature Financial Market 
An efficient financial market is a crucial factor for a successful funded social 
security system. It is important that the accumulated funds in the individual 
accounts can receive a sufficient return to maintain the purchasing power in the 
future. If the economic growth rate, as well as salary growth rate, exceeds the 
return of the accumulated fund, the living standard of the beneficiaries cannot be 
maintained or improved in line with the economic development. The focus of the 
social security reform in China is to establish a funded social security system. 
Here, we argue that the development of the financial market in China is not ready for 
the reform. There is not an adequate amount of suitable investment channels for the 
social security fund. 
According to the regulations, the major portion of the national social security 
fund should be invested in national bond. However, the bond market in China has 
not yet been established well. There is lack of the issuance of long-term national 
bond and the return of the national bond is low. Recently, the national social 
security fund is allowed to invest in the Chinese stock market directly and indirectly. 
Although the outstanding performance in these few years, the risky stock market in 
China may not be suitable for the investment of the social security fund. The vital 
concern in the Chinese stock market is corporate governance. 
Xu and Wong (1999) suggest that, in the operation of the state-owned 
enterprises, the protection of state's interest is doubtful due to a series of 
principal-agent problem. On the other hand, individual Chinese shareholders are in 
5 9 
a disadvantageous position because of the lack of proxy voting procedure. 
Watanabe (2002) argues that the pattern of corporate governance structure in China's 
listed company is the deeper problem comparing with ownership structure. Chinese 
listed company groups are usually headed by a holding company, which are under 
the government control. As a result, in line with the government interest, the 
corporate decision will be implemented, even if it undermines corporate development 
and exploits a listed company. World Bank (2002) proposes that the ownership 
structure has a direct bearing on the type of corporate governance issues that China 
currently confronts. On the other hand, information disclosure is a good tool to 
promote corporate governance. However, financial reporting and disclosure 
requirements in Chinese stock market are primarily oriented toward satisfying the 
taxation needs rather than for investors. 
Moreover, due to the foreign exchange control and other existing relevant 
regulations, the national social security fund is not allowed to invest in the global 
financial market, which could achieve better diversification. As a result, it is 
doubtful whether the accumulated funds in the individual accounts are sufficient to 
maintain the living standard of the beneficiaries in the future. If not, the burden will 
be still on the shoulder of the government, as well as their younger generation 
finally. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In most developed countries, the establishment of the social security usually 
functions as a "safety net" for the needy. However, more than that, the design of 
the social security system also aims at facilitating the economic reform in some 
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transition economies. On the other hand, the rapid economic growth and structural 
changes in those economies sharp the further social security reform in return. 
China has given us a fascinating example to observe in this regard. 
This paper documents the major historical developments of the social security 
system in China. In 1949, the new Chinese government decided to establish a 
modern social security system in order to maintain the political and social stability. 
However, the development of the system was hanged up during the Cultural 
Revolution in 1970s. In later 1970s, in response to the economic reform and "open 
policy" adopted by the Chinese government, the social security reform was 
recuperated from the suspension. In the earlier period, the focus of the social 
security reform was to facilitate the state-owned enterprise reform. Deepening the 
state-owned enterprise reform, the unemployment problem in China was 
undoubtedly worsened. The social security system played an important role to 
encourage excess labor force leaving their original state-owned enterprises and 
maintain the social stability. In the mid-90s, the private and foreign enterprises 
become the vital part of the Chinese economy. The social security system extends 
it coverage to the new players. On the other hand, the demographic structure 
change, say the aging population, damage the sustainability of the social security 
system. The unfunded social security system was changed into a two-tier system. 
The social security system in China is one of the most important factors to 
maintain the social security and economic growth in China. Hence, its 
sustainability is the most key question aroused much concern from academics and 
Chinese policy makers. The transition from the unfunded system into a two-tier 
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system caused a serious transition problem. As the last resort of the social security 
system, the fiscal strength of the Chinese government is questionable. On the other 
hand, the aging problem in China makes the pension system more fragile. Finally, 
the immature financial system cannot provide a strong support for the funded tier of 
the Chinese social security system. 
It is worthwhile to pay more attention to the future development of the Chinese 
social security system on account of its importance to the whole economy. First, 
the inter-relationship between social security system and fiscal strength of the 
Chinese government should be examined in detail. On the other hand, the exiting 
social security system covers largely the urban residents and excludes the rural 
counterparts, which contributing the majority of the population. Hence, the future 
social security reform should take it into consideration. Finally, the development of 
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Appendix 
Table 1 Industry share of gross product, without handicrafts 
Table. 1. Industry share of gross product, without handicrafts 
Year State enterprises State-capitalist Private 
enterprises enterprises 
1949 34?7 ^ 
1950 45.3 17.8 36.9 
1951 45.9 25.4 28.7 
1952 56.0 26.9 17.1 
195 3 57^ ^ 
Source: Kraus, Chapter One, p. 42 
Table 2 Penetration of social insurance in 1952 to 1957 
Table 2. Penetration of social insurance in 1952 to 1957 
Total Industrial employees Proportion with social 
Year (OOP's) insurance 
1952 15,804 21% 
1953 18,256 26% 
1954 18,809 29% 
1955 19,076 30% 
1956 24,230 31% 
1957 24,506 47% 
Source: Kraus, Chapter Two, p59. 
Table 3 Balance of Three Major Security Funds 
(in RMBIOOOO) 
Year Basic Pension insurance Medical Insurance Unemployment insurance 
Revenue Expense Balance Revenue Expense Balance Revenue Expense Balance 
1989 1467469 1188292 67899 — 
1990 1788178 1493363 978760 
1991 2157084 1730714 1440688 — — 
1992 3657660—3219145 2206083 — “ 
1993 5035402 4706303 2585889 14355 13335 4343 “ 
1994 7074245 6610902 3047662 31561 29113 7115 
1995 9500507 8476087 4298338 96667 72835 30982 — “ 
1996 11717^10318689"5785604 1%084 162336 64403 452491X272896.6 863802.6 
1997 1 ^ 9 0 5 1 1251328^6828482 523000 405000~ 166000 469392.3 3 6 3 2 ^ 9 6 9 9 0 0 . 9 " 
1998 1 4 5 8 9 7 ^ 15116267"5878332 6 0 5 9 ^ 5 3 2 9 7 0 199971 726111.1 560730.9 1334457 
1999 1 9 6 5 1 1 9 2 4 8 5 4 3 "7335416 8 9 8 6 ^ 6 9 0 7 3 5 575543 1252396 916445.7 1598555 
2000 122781285 [21154833 1947116511699984|l245411 |l098311 |l604436 |l234324 |l959333 
Source: China Labor Statistics Yearbook 2001 
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Table 4 Pension Contributors and Retirees in China 
Year No. of Employees No. of retirees Retirees-to-employees 
1989 48,169,054 8,933,544 0.185462309 
1990 52,007,013 9,653,101 0.185611525 
1991 56,536,574 10,865,757 0.192189873 
1992 77,746,588 16,814,953 0.216278983 
1993 80,081,670 18,394,447 0.229696096 
1994 84,941,412 20,794,000 0.24480403 
1995 87,377,929 22,411,584 0.256490217 
1996 87,584，105 23,583,113 0.269262476 
1997 86,709,700 25,334,300 0.292173771 
1998 84,758,275 27,273,130 0.321775425 
1999 95,018,110 29,835,976 0.314003046 
2000 |l 04,474,965 PO, 111,862 |o.288220838 一 
Source: China Labor Statistics Yearbook 2001 
Table 5 Re-employment Centre 
(in RMBIOOOO) 
Year Laid-off worker Re-employed Re-employment rate 
1998 1219 m 墨 
1999 丨 210 m 4}% 
2000 1098 m 33% 
2001 1891 \l27 b % 
Source: China Labor Statistics Yearbook 2001 
Table 6 Balance of Re-employment Centres in Some Regions 
(in RMBIOOOO) 
Last year Revenue Expenditure Surplus in 2000 
surplus 
National 2310525 ^ 3 6 1 4 4 24648328 1198341 
Beijing 0 287805 _ 287805 0 
Shanghai T3T029 Tl 39376 _1162560 107845 
Guangdong T63292 787331 854803 9 ^ 0 
Laoning 238542 1 ^ 4 5 6 2 2112683 60421 ~~ 
Gansu 15833 —418688 421334 13187 
Henan |l 18104 1938011 |939221 1116894 
Source: China Labor Statistics Yearbook 2001 
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Table 7 Unemployment in China 
(in RMB10000) 
Urban Registered Urban 
Year Unemployment Employment Rate 
1986 264.4 2 
1987 2 
1988 ^ 6 . 2 2 
1989 ^ 7 . 9 2.6 
1990 m 2 2.5 — 
1991 2.3 — 
1992 m 9 2.3 — 
1993 420.1 —2.6 
1994 476.4 ~2 .8 
1995 2.9 — 
1996 还 8 3 — 
1997 570 3.1 
1998 571 一 3.1 
1999 575 3.1 — 2000 1595 b.l 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook 2001 
Table 8 The Operation of Unemployment Insurance Funds 
(in R M B I O O O O ) 
Beneficiaries of 
Contributors at theUnemployment Reserve at 
Year year-end (person) Insurance funds Revenue Expenses the year-end 
1994 79,680,000 1,964,633 
1995 82,380,000 2,613,130 
1996 83,330,573 3,307,884 452,491 272,897 863,803 
1997 79,613,722 3，190,445 469,392 363,294 969,901 
1998 79,279,000 1,581,000 726,111 560,731 1,334,457 
1999 98,519,970 2,714,046 1,252,396 916,446 1,598,555 
2000 1103,262,674 3,297,489 |l,604,436 |l,234,324 |l,959,333 ~ 
Source: China Labor Statistics Yearbook 2001 
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Table 9 The Operation of Medical Insurance Funds 
(in R I ^ I O O O O ) 
Reserve at 
Year Contributors at the year-end Revenue Expenses the year-end 
Basic Medical Insurance Medical Insurance 
Employees Retirees Employees Retirees 
199 3 2,676,094 225,182 14,355 13,335 4,343 
199 4 3,745,924 257,408 31,561 29,113 7,115 
199 5 7,026,144 432,560 96,667 72,835 30,982 
199 6 7,911,835 644,715 190,084 162,336 64,403 
1997 2,954,494 738,742 12,934,579 992,015 523,000 405,000 166,000 
1998 4,017,360 1,076,359 11,079,683 2,613,458 605,924 532,970 199,971 
1999 4,698,570 1,240,773 10,395,529 4,318,220 898,660 690,735 575,543 
2000 |l8,181,600 k878,355 |l0,446,211�363，329 |l,699,984 |l,245,411 |l’098，311 
Source: China Labor Statistics Yearbook 2001 
Table 10 National Social Security Subsidiary Expenses and Expenditure for 
National Social Security Fund 
(in RMBIOO million) 
Social security subsidiary expenses National social security fund 
Year Budget Amount Actual Amount Budget Amount Actual Amount 
1998 0 150.1 0 0 
1999 168.15 ~343.64 — 0 
2000 460 525.97 — 0 ^ 
2001 635 786.22 0 309.78 
Source: Finance Yearbook of China 
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